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Abstract: Understanding the relation between logical empiricism and American 
pragmatism is one of the more difficult problems in the history of philosophy. In this 
paper I would like to take a local perspective and concentrate on the details that concern 
the vicissitudes of a philosopher who played an important role in the encounter between 
logical empiricism and American pragmatism, namely, Ernest Nagel. More precisely, I 
want to explore some aspects of Nagel’s changing attitude towards the “new” logical-
empiricist philosophy. In the beginning, Nagel welcomed logical empiricism almost 
wholeheartedly. This early enthusiasm did not last. Nagel’s growing dissatisfaction with 
the Carnapian version of logical empiricist philosophy was clearly expressed in his 
criticism of Carnap’s inductive logic and more generally in his last book, Teleology 
Revisited and Other Essays in the History and Philosophy of Science, where he criticizes 
Carnap’s philosophy of science in general as ahistoric and non-pragmatist. One of the 
distinctive features of Nagel’s philosophy of science was the emphasis that he placed on 
the role of the history of science in the philosophy of science. Compelling evidence for 
this attitude comes from his works on the history and philosophy of geometry and algebra. 
One may say that Carnap and Nagel represented opposed possibilities for how the 
profession of a philosopher of science could be understood: Carnap, as a “conceptual 
engineer”, was engaged in the task of inventing conceptual tools for a better theoretical 
understanding of science, while Nagel is better characterized as a “public intellectual” 
engaged in the more general practical project of realizing a more rational and enlightened 
society. 
 	
1 To be published in Ernest Nagel. Between Naturalist Pragmatism and Logical Empiricism, Edited by 
Matthias Neuber and Adam Tamas Tuboly, Springer. 
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1. Introduction. The relation between logical empiricism and American pragmatism is 
one of the more difficult problems in the history of philosophy.2 This relation cannot be 
described as a point-like event; rather, it was a process that evolved for various decades. 
For some time, a variety of contradicting narratives about this difficult and complicated 
issue have been espoused. 
In this paper, I do not want to tell another global story about this issue. Rather, I would 
like to take a more local perspective and concentrate on the details that concern the 
vicissitudes of a philosopher who played an important role in the encounter between 
logical empiricism and American pragmatism, namely, the American philosopher Ernest 
Nagel (1901 – 1985). Although Nagel was one of the most influential American 
philosophers of science in the middle of the 20th century, he has been unduly ignored in 
recent debates on the relation between logical empiricism and pragmatism. 
In this paper, I want to explore some aspects of Nagel’s changing attitude towards the 
“new” logical-empiricist philosophy arriving from Europe at the shores of the New World 
in the 1930s. Like many other scientifically minded American philosophers in the 
beginning, Nagel welcomed the logical empiricists whole-heartedly as allies in the project 
of the “cooperative, intensive cultivation of the methods of the sciences with the help of 
	
2 For the sake of simplicity let us assume in the following that there were only two parties of the encounter 
– the logical empiricists and the American pragmatists. Actually, this is a simplified description of the 
situation: Reality was more complicated. Science-oriented philosophy in US comprised more than 
pragmatism, there was an important philosophical current called “(Columbia) naturalism”, “contextualistic 
naturalism”, or “realism”, which was closely related to but different from genuine pragmatism (cf. Jewett 
(2011, 2012), Kuklick (2001). Perhaps it may even be expedient to speak of various different “prag–
matisms” at that time (cf. Tuboly (2021)). 
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the most advanced tools of modern logic” (Nagel (1940, (69)).3  He was one of the 
younger American philosophers who had visited with the proponents of European logical 
empiricism in the early 1930s before they were forced to emigrate to the US or elsewhere. 
Moreover, together with Charles Morris and others, he hosted many European emigrants 
when they had to build up a new life in US. As I want to show, this early cautious 
enthusiasm did not last. At the end of his philosophical career in the late 1970s, Nagel’s 
early positive attitude towards logical empiricism (essentially characterized by Carnap’s 
philosophy) had been replaced by a much more reserved attitude to put it mildly. 
Thus, instead of a global narrative about the general relation between two multi-faceted 
philosophical currents, I propose to pursue a kind of longitudinal analysis concentrating 
on one individual philosopher who played an important role in the encounter of the two 
movements. This is enough to refute some of the sweeping narratives on this issue 
presently propagated in the literature, or so I want to argue. 
European logical empiricism was present on the American scene, in one way or another, 
for approximately 50 years, from approximately the 1930s to the 1980s.4 Nagel’s career 
as a professional philosopher comprised roughly the same period. This fact may be taken 
as evidence that he may well serve as a (more or less reliable) individual witness of the 
events that took place in this historical period. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. To set the stage, in the next section, I briefly 
recall some of the main contemporary narratives that are en vogue to describe the complex 
relationship between logical empiricists and American pragmatists in the second third of 
the 20th century. All these narratives are of a global character - they all paint the relation 
	
3 Certainly not all, however. For instance, according to Jewitt, in 1948, J.H. Randall, one of the proponents 
of Columbia naturalism, still described Carnap as “a Prussian systematizer” who was “relatively insulated 
from the main currents of American experience and thought” (Jewitt (2011, 91)). Indeed, in the 1940s many 
pragmatists opposed Carnap-style semantics. 
4  Herbert Feigl came to America in 1931, Carnap passed away in 1970. Feigl and Hempel, often 
characterized as the “last logical empiricists”, lived until 1988 and 1997, respectively. 
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between the two philosophical currents with a broad brush, hardly taking into account the 
vicissitudes of individual philosophers. As I want to show, they all have difficulties to 
deal adequately with the case of Nagel. Indeed, he turns out to be an interesting challenge 
for all existing narratives of the relation between logical empiricism and American 
pragmatism. 
In the third section, I will deal with Nagel’s early work that exhibits what may be 
characterized as a cautious enthusiasm towards the “new logical empiricist philosophy”. 
In particular, Nagel’s contribution, Charles S. Peirce: Pioneer of Empiricism (Nagel 
1940), at the 5th International Congress for the Unity of Science in Harvard is considered 
here. 
The topic of section 4 is Nagel’s growing dissatisfaction with Carnap’s version of logical 
empiricist philosophy in the following decades. This dissatisfaction was clearly expressed 
in Nagel’s criticism of Carnap’s inductive logic (Nagel 1963) and more generally and 
more explicitly in his last book, Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the History and 
Philosophy of Science (Nagel 1979). 5  There, he criticized very harshly Carnap’s 
philosophy of science in general as ahistoric and outdated. 
One of the distinctive features of Nagel’s philosophy of science is the emphasis that he 
put on the role of the history of science for philosophy of science. Compelling evidence 
for this attitude is seen in his works on the history of geometry and algebra that, to the 
present day, are considered valuable contributions to the history of ideas. This aspect of 
Nagel’s philosophy of science is treated in section 5. Finally, in section 6, we briefly 
discuss the question of who the audience of philosophy of science is. One may say that 
Carnap and Nagel represented opposed possibilities for how the profession of a 
	
5 This book contains (among some other earlier texts of Nagel) his Dewey Lectures, which he delivered at 
Columbia University in 1977. These may be considered a kind of summa of Nagel’s philosophy and history 
of science. 
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philosopher of science may be understood: As will be discussed Carnap as a “conceptual 
engineer” was engaged in the task of inventing the conceptual tools for a better 
understanding of science as a complex endeavor in itself, while Nagel was to be 
considered more of a “public intellectual” engaged in the project of realizing a more 
rational and enlightened society. 
2. The Encounter of Logical Empiricism and American Pragmatism: A Potpourri of 
Narratives. The encounter between European logical empiricism and American 
pragmatism was a complex and multifaceted event of the history of philosophy in the 
20th century. Perhaps the simplest narrative of this event is Richard Rorty’s version of 
the (temporal) replacement of home-spun American pragmatism by logical empiricism. 
It goes like this: 
 
Along about 1945, American philosophers were ... bored with Dewey, and thus 
with pragmatism. They were sick of being told that pragmatism was the 
philosophy of American democracy, that Dewey was the great American 
intellectual figure of their century, and the like. They wanted something new 
... What showed up ... was logical empiricism, an early version of what we now 
call “analytic philosophy”. 
The incursion of this kind of philosophy was ... a mixed blessing. ... [I]t 
represented a temporarily fruitful confusion of a very good idea (that language 
was a more fruitful topic for philosophical reelection than experience) with a 
couple of rather bad ones (that there was something worth preserving in 
empiricism; ... ). (Rorty (1995, 70)) 
 
Fortunately, according to Rorty, the eclipse of pragmatism did not last for long. With 
Rorty himself actively engaged in the project, the eclipse was overcome in the next 
decades. At least, this is the story that Rorty wanted to make his audience believe: 
 
The narrative I have tried to construct in my books tells how the bad ideas 
gradually, in the course of the 1950s and 1960s, got filtered out and thus made 
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it possible for pragmatism to get a new lease on life by undergoing 
linguistification. (Rorty (1995, 70)) 
 
A different version of this eclipse narrative has been offered by Scott Soames. He skips 
the second half of Rorty’s story, i.e., for him the alleged resuscitation of classical 
pragmatism in the form of (Rortyan) neo-pragmatism the heroes of which were Dewey, 
Wittgenstein, and Heidegger, does not exist. In his narrative, even Dewey does not occur 
(to say nothing about Wittgenstein and Heidegger). According to Soames, the only 
contribution that American pragmatism had to offer to the new analytical wave was the 
logical achievements of Peirce and C.I. Lewis. As minor figures in the transition from the 
pre-analytic to the analytic period in American philosophy, Morris Cohen and Nagel are 
briefly mentioned (Soames (2008, 451/452)).    
Not all people agree with the stories told by Rorty and Soames. Cheryl Misak, for 
instance, in her book The American Pragmatists (Misak 2013), completely discards the 
replacement or eclipse narrative. According to her, the logical empiricist invaders were 
assimilated by American pragmatism in such a way that they hardly left any trace: 
 
One thing, however, should be clear from my account of the fortunes of 
pragmatism. Those who would argue that pragmatism was bullied into the 
backwaters by the logical empiricists … have their intellectual history wrong. 
Not only were there strong connections between pragmatism and logical 
empiricism, but the logical empiricists drifted closer and closer to their 
pragmatist cousins until the views were almost indistinguishable. (Misak 
(2013, 254)). 
 
These largely incompatible narratives may leave the reader somewhat perplexed, since 
even the simple question “At the end of the day, who replaced whom?” does not find a 
unanimous answer. Even less satisfying is what this potpourri of narratives has to offer 
for the task of determining Nagel’s position in this changing conceptual landscape. As 
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usual, Rorty’s overall general pastiche is of no use for discovering any detail. Soames 
mentions Cohen’s and Nagel’s early contributions to a (broadly understood) naturalist 
and empiricist philosophy of science but ignores Nagel’s later criticism of Carnapian 
logical empiricism. Misak’s assimilation narrative entails that Nagel should have 
recognized the later Carnap as a fellow pragmatist. However, as will be shown in the next 
section, this was not the case. 
Rorty, Soames, and Misak offer competing global narratives about the question of how 
the evolving relation of logical empiricism and American pragmatism may be understood. 
The following two proposals of Alan Richardson and Thomas Uebel are of a somewhat 
different nature. These authors deal with some more specific aspects of the encounter of 
the two movements that mainly concern a small group of proponents. Nevertheless, 
Nagel’s case is also a challenge. 
Richardson’s focus is on Carnap (cf. Richardson (2008)). According to Richardson, the 
emigration to America and contact with American pragmatists led Carnap to adopt a kind 
of sui generis pragmatism. As Richardson rightly points out, Carnapian pragmatism has 
to be distinguished from “genuine” American pragmatism. That Nagel did not recognize 
later philosophy of Carnap as pragmatism may be read as an indirect confirmation that 
“Carnapian pragmatism” was not identical (and perhaps not even compatible) with 
“genuine” or “ordinary” American pragmatism.6 Moreover, if Richardson is right (as I 
think he is), Carnap did not drift “closer and closer to his pragmatist cousins”, and, as will 
be shown in section 4, Nagel did not see him as someone who had drifted. Other European 
empiricists, such as Frank, Neurath, and Hempel, indeed may have drifted. However, they 
do not represent the entire logical-empiricist spectrum. 
	
6 Whether it is expedient to characterize Carnap’s later philosophy as a kind of pragmatism is, of course, 
another question. This question, however, will not be discussed in this paper.    	
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Another proposal for understanding the evolution of logical empiricism in America has 
been proposed by Uebel. His thesis is 
 
that we can ascribe to [the members of the left wing of the Vienna Circle] the 
conception of a [...] “bipartite metatheory”, a conception of philosophy of 
science as comprising both formal-logical and empirical investigations. ... 
This conception constitutes the “unified science” alternative to Moritz 
Schlick’s Wittgensteinian conception as meaning determination (Uebel 
(2012, 117)). 
 
The bipartite metatheory seems to offer an elegant and ecumenical (“tolerant”) way of 
doing a philosophy of science that everybody might feel comfortable with. Indeed, 
Carnap may be characterized as a partisan of such a theory. In a letter to Robert S. Cohen, 
he described the task of such a bipartite metatheory as follows: 
 
For a total (not only logical) theory and analysis of knowledge and science, it 
is certainly very important to take into account also activities, including (1) the 
practical behavior of scientists in their research work (this may include 
pragmatics but goes far beyond it), and (2) the ways in which science is of help 
in all fields of practical life. I have myself not made any investigations of these 
kinds; but this does not mean that I regard them as less important. (R.S. Cohen 
(1963, 150), quoting from a letter of Carnap written to R.S.C. dated 12. August 
1954) 
 
Cohen was less than fully convinced by Carnap’s answer and objected: 
 
But what is the status of a purely logical analysis of knowledge in a total theory 
of scientific knowledge, once pure syntactic and pure (formal) semantic 
reconstructions are left behind? (ibid.) 
 
Carnap seems to have assumed that the logical and the non-logical ingredients of a “total 
theory” of knowledge and science can be juxtaposed and put together in such a way that 
they form a conceptual whole. How the purely logical and the non-logical parts of the 
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total theory fit together, how they interacted with each other (if at all), was not a problem 
for him. Not all of his fellow philosophers were able to conceive of the issue in such a 
relaxed manner. For instance, Nagel was unable to see the conceptual unity allegedly 
underlying the two components of the bipartite metatheory. He came to the conclusion 
that Carnap’s version of philosophy of science was a deadlock, while he considered 
philosophers such as Frank, Hempel and others to be kindred spirits. 
More generally, Nagel is a problem for all existing narratives that aim to explicate the 
complex relation of logical empiricism and pragmatism: Nagel is a problem for Misak’s 
drifting thesis, since he would have vigorously denied that Carnap had drifted towards 
genuine pragmatism. Nagel has been a challenge for Rorty’s version of the eclipse 
narrative because, until the end of his life, he stuck to the thesis that science is the basis 
for a humane and liberal civilization (Nagel (1979, 10)). Very probably, Nagel would not 
have subscribed to Richardson’s thesis that Carnap’s later philosophy of science can be 
characterized as a kind of pragmatism. Of course, one may contend that Nagel simply got 
it wrong. However, perhaps this is a solution to the problem that is slightly too simple to 
be right. 
 
3. Cautious Enthusiasm. In 1939, the Fifth International Congress for the Unity of Science 
took place in Harvard/Massachusetts. Nagel was one of the congress participants. He took 
this opportunity to remind participants of the centennial anniversary 1839 of Peirce, 
presenting Peirce as a “pioneer of empiricism”, who had anticipated many of the insights 
that contemporary American pragmatism and the empiricism of the Vienna Circle had 
obtained independently from each other. For Nagel, this kind of convergence (which often 
occurred in science) was to be considered evidence that some measure of truth had been 
attained: 
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It is therefore a happy sign that so many of the central ideas of the present 
movement have been independently developed on both sides of the Atlantic. 
One is not minimizing the contributions of the Vienna Circle in pointing out 
that many of its recent views have been taken for granted for some time by 
American colleagues, largely because the latter have come to intellectual 
maturity under the influence of Peirce (Nagel (1940, 69/70)). 
... 
 Were [Peirce] still among us he would surely have endorsed the happy 
marriage of the cultivation of logic and the empirical temper which 
distinguishes this movement, and he would have joined hands with us in 
furthering the quest for and the understanding of progressively more adequate 
tools of inquiry. (ibid., 80) 
 
 Presenting Peirce as the founding father of empiricism required, of course, a considerable 
amount of philosophical surgery on the body of Peirce’s philosophy. Peirce’s highly 
metaphysical idealist systems had to be extirpated and excluded from consideration. The 
young Nagel had no qualms about doing just this. Moreover, according to Nagel, the 
Vienna Circle’s logical empiricism was an expedient tool for improving the central notion 
of Peirce’s pragmatism: 
 
“Peirce’s own formulation of the pragmatic maxim leaves much to be desired 
in the way of explicitness and clarity; and more recent formulations, such as 
those by Professor Carnap and others, have the same general intent but superior 
precision. (Nagel (1940, 73))  
 
Regrettably, Nagel never pointed out more precisely where Carnap had achieved such a 
remarkable deed, and Carnap never boasted to have done it. Thus, it remained unclear 
exactly where Carnap had proposed an improved version of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, 
to say nothing about the issue of whether he had faithfully followed such a maxim in his 
own philosophical work. 
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Although Nagel’s thesis that Carnap had the merit of having improved Peirce’s pragmatic 
maxim may sound slightly overstated, to put it mildly, Nagel was not the only one who 
claimed a profound affinity between logical empiricism and American pragmatism. Much 
later, a fellow empiricist of Carnap, Philip Frank, confessed that he had had a similar 
lightning recognition long ago even before the two had arrived in America: 
 
When I read [Carnap’s Aufbau] it reminded me strongly of William James’s 
pragmatic requirement, that the meaning of any statement is given by its “cash 
value,” that is, by what it means for human behavior. I wrote immediately to 
Carnap, “What you advocate is pragmatism. This was as astonishing to him as 
it had been to me. We noticed that our group ... had reached conclusions by 
which we could find kindred spirits beyond the Atlantic in the United States. 
(Frank (1949, 33)) 
 
In recent years, many different and quite sophisticated interpretations of Aufbau have 
been proffered; none of them, however, confirms Frank’s reading of Carnap’s opus 
magnum. Be this as it may, there can be no doubt that in the 1930s, members of both 
groups were strongly engaged in the project of bringing together the two philosophical 
movements. Even Carnap may have appeared as someone who had a keen interest in the 
project of t logical empiricism and American pragmatism joining forces. In Testability 
and Meaning (Carnap (1936/37), he jettisoned unnecessary philosophical ballast that 
hindered a closer alliance with pragmatism: First, he pointed out that methodological 
solipsism should not be considered the only possible solipsism and not even the best 
interpretation of the Aufbau. A fortiori, in no way should the logical empiricist philosophy 
of science be considered as being committed to methodological solipsism in general. 
Second, he abandoned the overly strong and unrealistic concept of (complete) 
verification, replacing it with (gradual) confirmation. Testability and Meaning is often 
taken as evidence for the emergence of a “new” flexible Carnapian logical empiricism 
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that subscribed to some essential philosophical theses of American pragmatism. A closer 
look reveals that this apparent assimilation was far from complete. 
Carnap complied with the pragmatist doctrine only on one point, namely, that the absolute 
verification of synthetic assertions was impossible, and thus, one had to be content always 
with a more or less complete confirmation. Other essential, possibly anti-pragmatic, 
ingredients of Carnap’s logical empiricism did not change after he came into contact with 
American pragmatism. 
From early on, Nagel was well aware of certain possibly non-pragmatic aspects of 
Carnap’s philosophizing. This was already evidenced in Nagel in 1940 (1940). On the 
one hand, he praised the Viennese philosopher as a kind of contemporary reincarnation 
of Peirce who had formulated Peirce’s “pragmatic maxim” in a more precise and better 
way than Peirce himself; on the other hand, he criticized Carnap – without explicitly 
mentioning his name – for not complying with the standards that Peirce had already set 
forth for a good pragmatist. Thus, from the very beginning, Nagel’s enthusiasm for 
Carnap’s logical empiricism must be characterized as a reserved or cautious enthusiasm. 
More precisely, in the early 1940s, Nagel’s reservations concerned the question of 
whether Carnap’s emerging semantics were fully compatible with a truly empiricist 
philosophy of science: 
 
Some have suspected, perhaps unjustly, that the recently inaugurated 
discipline of semantics will open wide the door for the rehabilitation of 
Bolzano's Saetze-an-Sich, Meinong's objectives, Russell's subsistents, and 
allied conceptions of the referends of signs. … I think it would be a retrograde 
step if modern logical empiricism were to revive them in a new form; for the 
great strength and promise of the movement has been its interpretation of the 
abstract in terms of the concrete, and its resolute turning from speculations 
which have no ascertainable consequences in issues of observable fact. I can 
think of no better way to still these suspicions than by placing the study of 
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semantics into a behavioral context, and by instituting an analysis of such key 
semantic terms as "designation" and "truth" as used in specific contexts, in 
order to reveal the modes of action they signify. (Nagel (1940, 76/77)) 
 
Obviously, Nagel considered himself to be one of those “who suspected…”. 7  His 
suspicion was confirmed a few years later when Carnap published his groundbreaking 
Introduction to Semantics (Carnap 1942). This is evident by Nagel’s review of this work 
in Nagel (1942). Carnap was at pains to dispel the concerns that his “empiricist friends” 
had with respect to semantics. He wanted to convince them that semantics were 
empiristically innocent. For this purpose, he published Empiricism, Semantics, and 
Ontology (ESO) in 1950. He argued that semantics are empiristically harmless. Now, the 
interesting point is the following: In 1954 (i.e., four years after the publication of ESO), 
Nagel considered it appropriate to republish the paper of 1940 in which he had voiced 
empiricist concerns with respect to semantics. At that time, Nagel certainly had taken 
notice of ESO, which had appeared in 1950. Nevertheless, he stuck to his 1940 paper. 
This evidence indicates that he did not accept Carnap’s defense of semantics in ESO. 
Rather, he stuck to his original criticism that Carnapian semantics was suspicious from 
an empirical point of view. 
In the sequel, Nagel felt no inclination to revise his verdict. This is seen by the fact that 
he published his criticism of Carnapian semantics twice without any change, although 
Carnap had seriously attempted to dissolve the empiristically and pragmatically founded 
doubts concerning his semantics. 
Let us return to Nagel and his approximation of the new logical empiricist wave. In 1939, 
he published one of the early successful contributions to Neurath’s International 	
7 Another prominent logical empiricist who suspected that Carnap’s “semantic turn” was a move	away from 
true empiricism was Neurath, who severely criticized Carnap in their correspondence in the 1940s (cf. 
Mormann (1991)). The quarrel concerning semantics led Carnap and Neurath almost to the breaking of 
their friendship. For some details, see the recently published letters of Carnap and Neurath in Cat and 
Tuboly (2021). 
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Encyclopedia of Unified Science, namely, the monograph The Principles of Probability 
(Nagel 1939). The Principles of Probability became a well-recognized standard work and 
could be considered an example of a successful collaboration between logical empiricism 
and pragmatism in the context of Neurath’s Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Nagel 
intended to take Peirce’s pragmatism as a framework for a genuinely pragmatist approach 
to probability. In the course of time, it turned out that Nagel’s conception was essentially 
different from that of Carnap and Reichenbach.8 
Nagel’s Principles of Probability intended to satisfy all requirements that a good unifying 
item of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science should satisfy. Nagel based his 
considerations on the founding fathers of American Pragmatism, Peirce and Dewey, but 
also mentioned Carnap’s then quite recently published Testability and Meaning and 
Frank’s Das Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen. Moreover, he brought Morris’ trisection of 
syntax, semantics, and pragmatics into play, characterizing Principles as a contribution 
that was relevant for its semantics and pragmatics of the concept of probability and not 
for its syntax. 
Thus, at least on the surface, The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science presented 
itself as a successful model of collaboration between logical empiricism and American 
pragmatism. In the official press announcement of the International Encyclopedia that 
was published in the volumes of all monographs of the first volume Foundations of the 
Unity of Science, the editors pointed out that the collaborators of the encyclopedia might 
have different points of view but that all agreed in considering the unity of science as the 
ideal aim of their efforts: 
 
	
8 On a detailed presentation of Nagel’s view on probability and his monograph in the Foundations 
of the Unity of Science, see Galavotti’s contribution to the present volume.  
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They agree that any form of speculation other than that recognized in science 
has to be eliminated they stress the importance of logical analysis in various 
fields and in taking into account the historical development of scientific 
concepts and regulative principles. Such collaborators include, for instance, 
persons stemming from the Vienna Circle, from the Berlin group of scientific 
philosophers, from the Polish school of logicians, from the group centering 
around Scientia and the Centre de Synthèse, as well as representatives of 
American pragmatists, the English analytical school, French conventionalism, 
… 
(Foundations of the Unity of Science) 
 
This description of a peaceful and harmonious collaboration of the various groups was – 
of course – a highly idealized picture of what truly happened. Behind the curtain, the 
activity of the proponents often could not be described as very harmonious (cf. Reisch 
(2006), Dahms (1999)). In particular, there were heavy quarrels over who should be the 
author for the piece on probability and induction. Originally, Reichenbach was chosen as 
the author for this item, but for several reasons, this was not realized (see Dahms (1999) 
for details). The clash between Nagel’s and Carnap’s conceptions of probability broke 
out only later in the 1950s and 1960s, since in the 1940s, Carnap’s ideas on probability 
and induction were still in an embryonic state. Hence, Nagel’s empiricist-pragmatist piece 
seems to have pleased everybody (with the possible exception of Reichenbach). It may 
have even been considered as evidence that Charles W. Morris’s program of a synthesis 
of formalism, pragmatism, and traditional empiricism that combined the virtues of these 
accounts while avoided their shortcomings was feasible.9 The idyllic picture of a fruitful 
	
9 Morris had sketched his program of a comprehensive, practice-oriented scientific philosophy 
already at the International Congress of Unified Science in Paris 1935. In a more elaborated 
version, he published a more elaborated version two years later in his booklet Logical Positivism, 
Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism (Morris 1937). Against the overly narrow logical 
empiricist understanding of philosophy as the syntax of the language of science (that Carnap  had 
propagated) Morris argued for a “scientific pragmatism” that comprised four levels: (1) 
Philosophy as Logic of Science, (2) Philosophy as Clarification of Meaning (Peirce), (3) 
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collaboration of European logical empiricism and American pragmatism that the 
Encyclopedia project (and more generally, Morris’s Paris program)  might have offered 
to a superficial observer in the 1940s did not last;  with respect to the issue of probability 
and induction, it would turn out to be an illusion only a few years later.   
 
 
4. Alienation and Disenchantment. When exactly Nagel’s disenchantment with orthodox 
logical empiricism began is hard to say. Although in his contribution to the Fifth 
International Congress for the Unity of Science 1939 in Harvard, he described American 
pragmatism as being in full harmony with logical empiricism, even though at that time, 
Nagel was not a dyed-in-the-wool logical empiricist. This is shown by his work on the 
philosophy of mathematics around the same time the logical empiricists arrived in the 
New World (Nagel (1935, 1939). In this work, Nagel ascribed to the history of science a 
much more prominent role for the philosophy of science than orthodox logical empiricists 
would have been prepared to swallow. This issue will be treated in more detail in the next 
section. 
In any case, a profound alienation between the philosophical outlooks of Carnap and 
Nagel is clearly documented in Nagel’s contribution to the Schilpp volume dedicated to 
Carnap (Schilpp 1963) and Carnap’s rejoinder to it. Nagel’s criticism of Carnap’s 
inductive logic is to be considered much more than a disagreement between fellow 
philosophers who considered each other to belong to the same movement.10 Moreover, 
Nagel’s “most ungracious essay” (Nagel (1963, 825)) cannot be dismissed as an insulated, 
perhaps only temporal disagreement concerning some technical details. Nagel 	
Philosophy as Empirical Axiology (Dewey), and (4) Philosophy as Empirical Cosmology 
(Whitehead). 
10 Schilpp (1963) was published with a long delay. Hence, it may seem plausible to assume that Nagel’s 
contribution is the result of work that can be traced back well into the mid-1950s. 
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republished it in his last book, apparently considering it an important piece of his 
philosophical legacy. 11  Nagel rejected Carnap’s conception of probability for 
fundamental reasons. According to him, Carnap’s account of probability and induction 
had little to do with the way these concepts were used in common-day life and the 
sciences. As he put it: 
 
... if the major criticisms advanced in [this essay] hold water, it shows that 
despite the remarkable constructive power and ingenuity Carnap has brought 
to the reconstruction of inductive logic, he has not resolved the outstanding 
issues in the philosophy of induction, and his general approach to the 
problems is not a promising one. (Nagel (1963, 825)) 
 
Carnap’s answer to Nagel’s politely formulated, but radical, critique was unmistakable: 
I am sorry that my overall reaction to the essay by my dear old friend Ernest 
Nagel could not be more positive. My convictions on the possibility and the 
nature of inductive logic, acquired in many years’ work and vindicated by 
constant reexamination, can only be shaken by strong arguments (Carnap 
(1963, (995)). 
 
In plain English, then, for Carnap, Nagel had failed to bring forward “strong arguments” 
against the former’s inductive logic. 12  Nagel was not impressed by Carnap’s harsh 
criticism. On the contrary, he flatly ignored it and stuck to his position until the end of his 
	
11 Nagel’s alienation and disappointment with orthodox logical empiricism as evidenced by Nagel (1979) 
has been ignored in the secondary literature: Limbeck-Lilienau (2012) and Misak (2008, 2013) do not 
mention Nagel (1979) at all. This holds true, of course, for Uebel (2007), since this paper only deals with 
the early years of the relation between the Vienna Circle and American pragmatism.   
12 Nagel was not the only contributor who was rebuked by Carnap in this way: According to Carnap, Popper 
had – once again – completely misunderstood him, Putnam’s claim that Carnapian inductive logic was 
impossible was simply dismissed.  
Carnap did not disagree, however, with Kemeny, who put forward the thesis that “the problem of induction 
... [was] certainly the central issue in any philosophy of science” and ended with the hymnical conclusion 
that “we must class Carnap’s contribution to the problem of induction among the greatest achievements of 
modern Philosophy (sic)” (Kemeny (1963, 711, 737). Recent assessments of the feasibility of an inductive 
logic in Carnap’s do not confirm Kemeny’s praise of Carnap’s achievement (cf. Sterkenburg (2018)).   
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life. Almost ten years after Carnap’s death, he re–published his verdict, put forward in 
Schilpp (1963) without any change or any further explanation. Thus, it may be considered 
his last word on Carnap’s inductive logic, which some, Carnap himself among them, 
considered to be the flagship of his philosophy of science. Nagel was not just anybody in 
the logical-empiricist community. After all, he was the author of The Principles of 
Probability Theory (Nagel (1939)), i.e., logical empiricism’s official monograph on 
probability and induction, in The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. 
At the end of his philosophical career, Nagel’s critique of Carnapian logical empiricism 
was no longer confined to Carnap’s inductive logic. Its target had been widened and 
become Carnap’s philosophy of science in general. In one of Nagel’s introductions 
(1979), he singled out Carnap’s version of the logical empiricist philosophy of science, 
calling it obsolete in its entirety. Compared with the classical pragmatisms of Peirce and 
Dewey on the one hand and other versions of logical empiricism such as those of Frank 
and von Mises, Carnap’s orthodox logical empiricism came off the worst. Pointing out 
that the philosophy of science of the philosophy of the logical empiricists Frank and von 
Mises was not formalist or ahistoric, Nagel blamed the Carnapian philosophy of science 
as being responsible for the recent rise of a new orientation in the philosophy of science 
that was skeptical of the efficacy of the scientific method for attaining genuine 
knowledge: 
 
Much of the animus of the “new orientation” in the philosophy of the science 
is directed against the alleged ahistorical character of the “orthodox 
approach”; against the latter’s supposed claim that the observational evidence 
for a scientific theory can be assessed by using the rules of a formal calculus; 
… These characterizations of the “old philosophy of science” are conceivably 
true of some philosophers in this category (for example, Rudolf Carnap). 
These characterizations are a caricature of most of the older generation of 
writers on the subject (for example, C.S. Peirce, Josiah Royce, John Dewey, 
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M.R. Cohen, or P.W. Bridgman), and they are not even true of some of 
Carnap’s fellow logical positivists (such as Philipp Frank or Richard von 
Mises). Unlike Carnap, none of these thinkers subscribed to an ahistorical 
evaluation of the evidence for a scientific theory; and none of them identified 
the rationality of science with the use of exclusively formal canons for 
assessing claims to knowledge. It is misleading to ascribe to all 
representatives of the “orthodox approach” to the philosophy of science the 
beliefs that are idiosyncratic of what at best is a relatively small subset of that 
group of thinkers (Nagel (1979, 3)). 
 
This global criticism may be considered an extrapolation of Nagel rejection of Carnap’s 
project of inductive logic. Nagel did not subscribe to a kind of “bipartite metatheory” 
such as that of Uebel, according to which logical empiricists such as Frank and von Mises 
on the one side and Carnap on the other side worked on the same project of a 
comprehensive logical empiricist philosophy of science.13 Nagel did not recognize the 
allegedly possible division of labor between those who dealt with the logical aspects of 
science and those who concentrated on the empirical aspects. At the end of the day, Nagel 
considered Carnap’s logical way to be misguided and fruitless.  
While in his replies to Nagel, Putnam, and Popper in Schilpp (1963) Carnap sharply 
rejected the criticisms that these authors had put forward against his logic of induction, 
his replies to Morris, Cohen, and Frank are formulated in more reconciliatory tone. With 
respect to pragmatism, in rather vague terms he even expressed his gratitude to American 
pragmatism in general:  
 
The influence of the pragmatist ideas has been very fruitful for the 
development of my conceptions. It did not derive so much from the works of 
the founders of pragmatism (whose formulations I could often not easily 
	
13 Perhaps surprisingly, in Nagel (1979), Neurath and the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science 
are not mentioned even once, whereas Hempel’s account of functional explanation in biology is discussed 
in detail in the last section of the book. 
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accept, e.g., Peirce’s metaphysics and Dewey’s discussions of logical and 
epistemological problems), but from later representatives such as C.I. Lewis, 
Charles Morris, Ernest Nagel, and Sidney Hook, whose formulations seemed 
clearer and closer to those customary in science. Carnap (1963, 861)) 
 
Thereby Carnap elegantly placed himself on the side of rationality and science: Although 
classical pragmatists such as Peirce and Dewey scientifically left something to be desired, 
Carnap generously admitted that things had improved with the younger generation of 
pragmatists. This sounded more like a substantial rapprochement between pragmatism 
and logical empiricism than it truly was: Actually, it is hard to find any reference to Lewis 
in Carnap’s work – with the exception of Testability and Meaning (Carnap 1936). The 
same is true for references to Morris, Nagel and Hook.14   
In any case, the alleged “fruitful influence of pragmatist ideas on [Carnap’s] conceptions” 
was not later acknowledged by Nagel. In contrast, he did not recognize Carnap as a fellow 
pragmatist. At the end of his philosophical career, Nagel considered Carnap to be 
representative of an obsolete formalist philosophy of science. On the other hand, Nagel 
later explicitly sympathized with Frank’s Austro-American version of logical empiricism. 
That is, he did not subscribe to an approach that, much later, Uebel baptized as a “bipartite 
metatheory” of the philosophy of science to which the members of the left wing of the 
Vienna Circle subscribed. According to Uebel, Carnap’s formal philosophy and science 
and the more empirically oriented psychological, sociological, and historical works of his 
fellow Vienna Circle philosophers of science were to be considered two components of a 
comprehensive “bipartite metatheory” of the philosophy of science. Whatever the virtues 
	
14 For instance, the above quotation above is the only one where Carnap mentions the work of Sidney Hook 
in Schilpp (1963). One of the editors (Tuboly) has pointed out to me that the lack of direct reference to 
Morris, Nagel, and Hook in Carnap’s work leaves open the possibility that these authors “influenced Carnap 
informally by every-day discussions, joint seminars” and the like. I must admit that I have no idea what this 
could mean exactly. Rather, I would interpret Carnap’s apparently liberal attitude to these and others 
scholars as a clever strategy designed to appear as a paragon of tolerance and open-mindedness and at the 
same time pursue his own very specific philosophical projects without paying too much attention to others. 
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of the bipartite metatheory might be, Carnap, as one of its early practitioners, did not 
convince his “good old friend” Nagel of them. 
 
 
5. A Role for the History of Science in the Philosophy of Science. For some time, it has 
been commonplace knowledge that a good philosophy of science cannot be developed 
without taking into consideration a good amount of the history of science.15 For Nagel, 
the thesis that the philosophy of science has to take into account the history of science 
would hardly have been exciting news. For his John Dewey Essays, he chose the title 
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science. 
Throughout his career as a philosopher of science, issues of history of science played an 
important role for him. This holds true particularly for the history of mathematical 
sciences, which he had pursued since the beginning of his career as a professional 
philosopher; for details on this, see his “Impossible Numbers”: A Chapter in the History 
of Modern Logic (Nagel (1935 (1979)) and The Formation of Modern Conceptions of 
Formal Logic in the Development of Geometry (Nagel (1939 (1979)). 
Nagel’s contributions to the philosophy and history of mathematics are still discussed 
today (cf. for example, Kitcher (2012), Stump (2015), and Blanchette (2017)). The fact 
that Nagel republished these early pieces in his last book after more than forty years is 
evidence that he considered them permanently relevant pieces of his philosophical 
work.16 	15	For	a	discussion	of	the	various	ways	in	which	the	philosophy	and	history	of	science	may	collaborate	in	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	 their	 common	 subject,	 see	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	Festschrift	for	Michael	Friedman	Discourse	on	a	New	Method	–	Reinvigorating	the	Marriage	of	History	
and	Philosophy	of	Science	edited	by	Domski	and	Dickson	(2007).	16	This	is	confirmed	by	the	following	late	comment	of	Nagel,	found	in	Nagel	(1979):	“[These	papers]	are	the	sole	fruits	of	a	long	since	abandoned	plan	to	write	a	comprehensive	history	of	changes	during	the	19th	century	in	methodological	ideas	employed	in	various	branches	of	inquiry	–	in	the	natural,	psychological,	and	social	sciences,	but	also	in	a	number	of	humanistic	disciplines	(such	as	history,	legal	scholarship,	and	hermeneutics”	Nagel	(1979,	318).	
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Let us briefly discuss “Impossible Numbers” and compare it with a piece by Carnap 
written slightly earlier that deals with the issue of “impossible numbers”, although of a 
different kind. Today, the “impossible numbers” Nagel dealt with are just the familiar 
“complex numbers”. They have the form (a + ib) and appear as roots of polynomials 
p(x):= anxn + an-1xn-1 + ... + a1x + a0. From the perspective of modern mathematics, the 
numbers (a + ib) (in particular their “imaginary parts” ib) are no more mysterious than 
ordinary “real” numbers Thus, some conceptual effort is required to understand why, for 
such a long time in the evolution of mathematics, these numbers (and others as well) were 
considered epistemologically and ontologically dubious. 
Traditionally, a “number” is conceived of as being an answer to the question “How 
many?” and, in cases of extensive measure, “How much?” Evidently, complex numbers 
cannot be considered reasonable answers to these traditional questions. Consequently, 
they are “impossible numbers”. Negative numbers are difficult to conceive of as answers 
to questions concerning quantity and extension. On the other hand, “impossible numbers” 
are undeniably useful. Thus, if mathematics is to be the science of quantity, then complex 
numbers, not being quantities in any intelligible sense, must be considered “impossible 
numbers”. Thus, it cost mathematicians and philosophers alike a great deal of conceptual 
effort to understand that mathematics should not be understood as the science of quantity 
in the traditional sense. 
In the following, only Impossible Numbers will be treated in some detail. It should be 
noted, however, that in The Formation of Modern Conceptions of Formal Logic in the 
Development of Geometry, Nagel argued for the very same general thesis, namely, that 
for a more profound understanding of modern science, in particular for the understanding 
of modern logic and mathematics and that their role in the ongoing development of 
modern science and the history of the sciences is essential. This attitude stands in strong 
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contrast to that of Carnap, who around the same time discussed another kind of 
“impossible number” but with a quite different attitude than Nagel. Thus, Nagel’s 
philosophy of mathematics was interested in a history of mathematical ideas or concepts 
that went beyond a mere presentation of their logical relations. More precisely, Nagel 
argued that some 
Central doctrines of contemporary logic will become illuminated and made 
more persuasive by examining the developments in which they terminate. In 
particular, a consideration of the procedures of mathematics within the 
historical settings in which they operate may provide materials for a just 
appraisal of the limitations of traditional conceptions of mathematics and 
logic, as well as of the more recent views that have replaced them. (Nagel 
(1979, 196)) 
In Carnap’s logicist philosophy of mathematics, one does not find anything even remotely 
similar. From a Carnapian perspective, there was always a strict distinction between a 
logically correct formulation of a concept, and some logically flawed precursors. The on-
going evolution of science was assumed always to end in “unobjectionable logically 
precise definitions”. An instance of this attitude is provided by Carnap’s remarks on 
infinitesimals as a kind of “impossible number” vividly discussed by many 
mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics since the end of the 19th century. Carnap 
gave them short shrift: 
  
The inventors of the infinitesimal calculus (Leibniz and Newton) ... could not 
say ... what actually is to be understood by the “derivative” of a function. They 
could ... not give a precise definition of the concept “derivative”. However, 
their formulations for this definition used such expressions as “infinitesimally 
small magnitude” ... turn out to be pseudoconcepts (empty words). It took more 
than a century before an unobjectionable definition of the general concept of a 
limit and thus of a derivative was given. Only then all those mathematical 
results which had long since been used in mathematics were given their actual 
meaning. (Carnap (1928), 307/308)) 
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For Carnap, the history of science did not teach anything to the philosophy of science. 
This holds even after Carnap came to emphasize the importance of “logical tolerance”. 
This is evidenced by the fact that he completely ignored the logical and philosophical 
relevance of Robinson’s “Non-standard analysis” that offered a logically flawless 
definition of “infinitesimally small numbers”.  
In contrast, according to Nagel, we may learn a lot about science from the history of a 
science. This holds true, in particular, for mathematics. For instance, from the history of 
mathematics we can learn that “[t]he proper and exclusive subject matter of mathematics 
is not quantity”, as many philosophers have claimed (Nagel (1935, 167)) This thesis is 
elaborated in considerable detail in his papers “Impossible Numbers”: A chapter in the 
History of Modern Logic (Nagel 1935) and The Formation of Modern Conceptions of 
Formal Logic in the Development of Geometry (Nagel 1939). The logical empiricists’ 
official “identification” of mathematics and logic, or, more precisely, the “derivation” of 
the former from the latter, is quite useless in this endeavor. Thus, Nagel’s work in the 
philosophy and history of mathematics goes in a quite different direction than Carnap’s 
logicist approach.     
 
6. Philosophy of Science – Who is the Audience?17 The difference between a logical 
empiricist philosophy of science and a pragmatist philosophy of science, as exemplified 
by Carnap and Nagel, should not be conceived of solely as a matter of different personal 
styles. Rather, it points to a profound difference in how the role of the philosophy of 
science is understood.  
	
17 The second half of this section’s title is borrowed from Kitcher (2019). 
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Nagel’s account was based on the pragmatist assumption that the task of the philosophy 
of science is to clarify the broad significance of science for human life. This significance 
goes beyond the practical control over nature that science yields. Science is more than a 
set of practically useful technologies. For Nagel, science made the world intelligible. It 
satisfied the human craving to know and understand, as Aristotle had asserted.18 The task 
of a philosophy of science is to contribute to a “scientific culture”, as the Neo-Kantian 
Cassirer would have said. A Carnapian philosopher of science might not have militated 
explicitly against this aim, but he or she would have preferred to describe the 
philosopher’s task more theoretically as kind of conceptual engineering directed towards 
the improvement of the conceptual apparatus of science.  
Nagel was an Aristotelian naturalist who considered the desire for knowledge to be an 
ingredient of human nature. Patrick Suppes, who was Nagel’s student and later became 
one of the most influential philosophers of science of the second half of the 20th century, 
wrote in a biographical memoir of his teacher: 
 
[What] is most important to emphasize about [Nagel’s] more than forty years’ 
association with Columbia University is the central role he played in the 
intellectual life of Columbia, and more generally, of New York City. To many 
students he was the outstanding spokesman of what philosophy could offer in 
terms of the analysis of the scientific method, as it is practiced in many different 
sciences, and in the relation between science and perennial problems of 
philosophy such as those of causality and determinism. … 
... Throughout his career Nagel tried to combine the best elements of Cohens’s 
philosophical realism and Dewey’s radical instrumentalism. … It is fair to say 
that the range of his scientific interests and knowledge exceeded that of any 
	
18 Indeed, as Dewulf recently argued convincingly, Nagel’s philosophy of science may be characterized as 
a kind of Aristotelian philosophy of science (cf. Dewulf (2018, 156 – 157)). See also Deowulf’s contribution 
to this volume. 
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other philosopher of science of his generation in the United States. (Suppes 
(1994, 258 - 259)).19 
 
Nagel’s role as a philosopher of science, as described by Suppes, was quite different from 
the Carnapian model of the philosopher as a linguistic engineer engaged in the 
construction of conceptual apparatuses that work in an optimal way for some purpose or 
other. Without denying the existence of far-reaching differences between their 
philosophical convictions, philosophers such as Nagel, Lewis, Dewey, and even Rorty 
should be grouped in a different class of philosophers from the conceptual engineer 
Carnap, who more resembled a player of Hesse’s glass bead game than a pragmatist 
committed to the actual world.20 For Carnap, societal praxis remained a matter of private 
commitment, so to speak. Nagel’s praxis of a professional philosopher of science relied 
on a quite different idea.21 
Natural, although somewhat embarrassing, questions for many philosophers of science 
are “What is the philosophy of science good for?”, “Who is the audience of the philosophy 
of science?”, or “To whom is the philosophy of science addressed?” (cf. Kitcher (2019)). 
Kitcher proposed three possible answers: 
 
Philosophers, scientists, and interested citizens within and beyond the 
academy. I argue that our discipline is potentially relevant to all three, but I 
particularly press the claims of the interested citizens. (Kitcher (2019, 1)) 
 
	
19 Further information about Nagel as a leading figure in the philosophical and cultural life of New York 
can be found in Jewitt (2012) and Dewulf (2018). 
20 This is not to deny that Carnap personally showed much social commitment, but this commitment was 
not founded in his theoretical convictions as a professional philosopher of science. Expressed in a somewhat 
unfriendly way, the “boundless ocean of possibilities” that he evoked emphatically in The Logical Syntax 
of Language (Carnap 1937) may have some features in common with Hesse’s Glass Bead Game 
(1943(2002)).  There are some authors who would strongly reject such a suspicion, see for instance Carus’s 
book Carnap and Twentieth-century Thought: Explication as Enlightenment (Carus 2007) where Carnap’s 
philosophy is praised enthusiastically as the outstanding paradigm of a radically modern enlightenment 
philosophical position “strikingly relevant in 21. century”. 
21 For this aspect of Nagel’s philosophy see Schliesser’s contribution to this volume. 
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Obviously, for a Carnapian conceptual engineer, the educated citizen is not the first 
addressee. Scientific engineering aims to improve the conceptual apparatus of the 
sciences. Whether this kind of logical philosophy of science actually has been relevant to 
scientists can be doubted as well. Be this as it may, Nagel’s way of doing the philosophy 
of science came rather close to Kitcher’s comprehensive idea of the discipline. 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks. In the 1930s, Nagel’s role in the ongoing encounter between 
logical empiricism and American pragmatism can be accurately described as a committed 
mediator and bridge builder between the two movements. In later years, this description 
is no longer true. Nagel’s negative assessment of Carnap’s later philosophy (first, his 
account of probability and inductive logic and later, his approach in its entirely) shows 
that for Nagel, the much-evoked convergence between logical empiricism and American 
pragmatism had not taken place.22 
Nagel’s rejection of Carnap’s logical approach cannot be misunderstood as the reaction 
of a philosopher who was simply unable to understand formal arguments. Rather, Nagel 
rejected Carnap’s philosophy as an ultimately non-pragmatist way of doing philosophy 
that did not take into account (or even explicitly rejected) the fundamental connection of 
knowledge, action and valuation that the pragmatist Lewis expressed in a concise way as 
follows: 
 
Knowledge, action, and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary 
and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action; 
knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in 
evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate 
	
22 This fact does not exclude that there have been logical empiricists, who may be said to have 
“converged” or “drifted” to pragmatism, e.g., Frank and Hempel (cf. Mormann (2017), Wolters 
2001). TUBOLY S AND REISCH’S EDITION OF FRANK’S BOOK. HARD TO ACCESS 
FRANK. USUALLY VERY WEAK… 
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action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be 
impossible. Conversely, only an active being could have knowledge, and only 
such a being could assign values to anything beyond his own feelings. (Lewis 
(1946, 5)) 
Despite paying lip-service to the contrary, hard-boiled logical empiricists such as Carnap 
never acknowledged this connection without caveats. This attitude rendered impossible a 
close relationship between Carnapian logicist empiricism and American genuine 
pragmatism. 
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